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Abstract: During his presidential campaign, the new elected President of U.S., Donald Trump, 
called for a complete ban on Muslims from entering the United States. Although numerous 
European observers have been shocked by his racist proposal, using the most recent round of the 
European Social Survey, this paper found that a sizeable proportion of Europeans support a 
similar ban in their own countries, e.g. Czech Republic (54%), Hungary (51%), Estonia (42%), 
Poland (33%), and Portugal (33%). The paper also provides evidence that racism and 
immigration phobia play a key role in shaping Europeans’ support of a ban on Muslim 
immigration. This finding challenges the discourse and campaigns of the populist groups who 
exploit the ‘Islamization of Europe’ rhetoric successfully and use various pretexts to justify a call 
for a ban on Muslims’ immigration, e.g. the threat to security, secularism, democracy, Western 
‘identity’, culture and values. 
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Introduction 
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, European Muslim 
minorities have been perceived as a threat to national ‘identity’ and security due to their religious 
faith (Allen and Nielsen 2002), and their integration, whether immigrant or born and raised in the 
countries where they live, is the object of recurrent debate that systematically intensifies 
following any terrorist attack claimed by Muslim extremists on behalf of Islam1.   
Nowadays, the European dominant image of Muslims, who number almost 1.6 billion and 
constitute over one fifth of humanity, is based on imagination and stereotypes. Muslims are 
perceived as fanatical, prone to violence and disrespectful towards women2 and are associated in 
the European public mind to extremism and terrorism despite evidence suggesting that Muslims 
have been and continue to be the primary victims of terrorism3. As one might expect, a high 
proportion of Europeans have an unfavourable opinion towards Muslims minorities living in their 
countries, e.g. Hungary (72%), Italy (69%), Poland (66%) and Greece (65%) (see Wike, Stokes, 
and Simmons 2016). It is not surprisingly then that far-right political parties and other populist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Madrid train and London subway bombings (2004, 2005), the attack of the Jewish Museum of Belgium (2014), 
the terrorist attack against the French magazine Charlie Hebdo’s offices and the kosher supermarket in Paris (2015) 
and the attacks across Brussels, Nice and Paris (2016). This list is not exhaustive but just indicative. 
2 As illustration for this point, whereas a solid majority of Spaniards (83%) and Germans (78%) believe that Muslims 
are fanatical and violent (respectively 60% and 52%) only tiny proportions consider that they are respectful of 
women, respectively 12% and 17%, PEW Research Center (2006).  
3 Even though the victims of terrorist attacks should not be compared numerically, the US National Counter 
Terrorism Center 2011 US report on terrorism found that “In case where religious affiliation of terrorism casualties 
could be determined, Muslims suffered between 82% and 97% of terrorism-related fatalities over the past five 
years”. 
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groups, who successfully exploit the ‘Islamization of Europe’ rhetoric, have called for a complete 
ban on Muslim immigration finding great resonance in public opinion4. The result, today 
Muslims’ immigration is viewed negatively by a substantial proportion of the European general 
public. For instance, the most recent round of the European Social Survey (ESS) data reveal that 
over one-in-two respondents in the Czech Republic (54%) and Hungary (51%) and at least one-
in-three in Estonia (42%), Lithuania (34%) and Poland (33%) would like their countries to ban 
Muslim immigration.  
The paper seeks to contribute to the discussions about islamophobia across Europe by focusing 
attention on the opposition to Muslim immigration that represents one of its manifestations. More 
precisely, I investigate whether and to what extent racism and xenophobia are key determinants 
of Europeans’ hostility towards Muslim immigration. I predict that, other things being equal, 
those who hold racist beliefs and express a high level of xenophobia towards immigration in 
general would be more likely to favour a ban on Muslims. The contribution of this paper to the 
literature on attitudes towards immigration is twofold. Firstly, although there is voluminous 
literature on public attitudes towards immigrants in general or specific groups, e.g. asylum seeks 
and refugees, we currently know nothing about the driving forces behind Europeans’ opposition 
to Muslims’ immigration.  
This limitation is principally due to the absence of a dataset that captures public opinion on the 
preferred level of Muslims’ immigration. Fortunately, this lacuna has been filled by the 
immigration module of the most recent round of the ESS that incorporated a question that offers a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 An illustrative example, the Dutch MP and leader of the Party for Freedom, a right-wing nationalist political party, 
Geert Wilders has called for a complete shut down of immigration from Muslim countries to the Netherlands (Ogan 
et al. 2014).	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unique opportunity to examine this issue for the first time from a global perspective. Secondly, a 
large body of empirical studies has tested several theories including contact theory, group threat 
theory and social identity theory, which have pointed at the role of different factors in explaining 
individuals’ attitudes towards immigrants and immigration policy. For a review of this literature 
see, among others, Citrin et al. (1997), Sides and Citrin (2007), Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) and 
Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014). Of course this literature has contributed significantly to our 
understanding of several facets of this phenomenon. However, the role of racism has not received 
much attention as put clearly by Ayers et al. (2009, 594), ‘Although political elites agree that 
racism is a possible factor influencing immigration preferences, empirical investigations have yet 
to fully document the role of racism in public opinion on immigration’. However, very few 
notable exceptions exist, Pettigrew and Meertens (1995), Dustmann and Preston (2007), Rydgren 
(2008) and Ayers et al. (2009). Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge, to date, no study has 
explored the relationship between racism and individuals’ support of a restrictive immigration 
policy towards Muslims.  
In addition, even though a few empirical studies have examined the determinants of anti-Muslim 
sentiment, Strabac and Listhaug (2008), Savelkoul et al. (2011), Ciftci (2012) and Ogan et al. 
(2014), none of these studies has looked at the resistance to Muslims’ immigration. The objective 
of this paper is to do just that. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section two 
presents the data used. Section three describes the empirical method employed and discusses the 
regression results. Section four concludes. 
Data and descriptive statistics  
For the empirical analyses I used the individual-level data drawn from the most recent European 
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Social Survey (ESS) immigration module fielded, between 2014 and 2015, in 20 European 
countries and Israel5. The countries’ data for this nationally representative survey were pooled 
into one dataset containing information on 40,185 respondents. Given that the paper analysis 
focuses on attitudes of Europeans towards Muslim immigrants, I excluded Israel from the 
database reducing the number of respondents to 37,623. The countries included in this analysis 
are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 
and United Kingdom6. This sample offers the opportunity to consider countries that vary 
considerably in many respects in particular in terms of Muslim minorities’ population size and 
contact with Muslims, e.g. whereas Muslim minorities’ presence in Lithuania and Poland dates 
back to the 14thcentury (Górak-Sosnowska 2011), in countries such as Belgium it is a relatively 
recent phenomenon. Nevertheless, all these countries are experiencing a growing anti-Muslim 
sentiment. The survey items used in this analysis and the variables they created will be discussed 
below. 
Descriptive statistics and dependent variable 
The European Social Survey (ESS) includes seven questions intended to tap respondents’ 
preference on how many immigrants of different types should be admitted to their country: ‘To 
what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most 
[country] people to come and live here?’, ‘How about people of a different race or ethnic group 
from most [country] people?’, ‘How about people from the poorer countries in Europe?’, ‘How 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For more information and documentation, see the ESS website: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/  
6 The United Kingdom sample is restricted to Great Britain. 
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about people from poorer countries outside Europe?’, ‘To what extent you think [country] should 
allow Jewish people from other countries to come and live in [country]?’, ‘…Muslims from other 
countries to come and live in [country]?’ and ‘Gypsies from other countries to come and live in 
[country]?’. In all cases, answers were given on 4-point rating scales: ‘allow many’, ‘allow 
some’, ‘allow a few’ and ‘allow none’.  
Turning our attention to respondents’ views concerning Muslims immigration. The first thing to 
note from an examination of Table 1 is that an overwhelming majority of Europeans reported that 
they are in favour of a restriction on Muslims’ immigration. For example, over 80% of 
respondents in the Czech Republic (83%) and Hungary (82%) would like their countries to allow 
few or allow no Muslim immigrants. The equivalent proportion is 70% in Estonia and 65% in 
Poland. In contrast, at the other end of the scale a lower percentage of respondents in Sweden 
(18%) and Germany (28%) share the same opinion. The same Table indicates that a majority of 
Czechs (54%) and Hungarians (51%) are in favour of a complete ban on Muslim immigration to 
their countries. Relatively smaller proportions, but still notable, among Estonians (42%), 
Lithuanians (34%), Portuguese (33%) and Poles (33%) expressed the same opinion. 
Insert Table 1 here 
It is remarkable to see that negative attitudes towards Muslim immigration are much stronger in 
countries such as Hungary and Poland where Muslims represent small minorities. Paradoxically, 
a Friedrich Ebert Foundation report co-authored by Zick, Küpper and Hövermann (2011) found 
that 61% of Hungarians and 47% of Poles consider that there are too many Muslims living in 
their country, even though this fraction does not even reach 0.2%. Perhaps this strange situation 
is due to the fact that these countries’ citizens perceive Muslim minorities as much larger than 
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they really are, and the available evidence points in this direction. According to a poll conducted 
by Ipsos in 2014, on average, Hungarians and Poles thought that Muslims living in their country 
make up respectively 7% and 5% of national populations. 
An inflated perception of minority populations in general and immigrant populations in particular 
has been recognized as an important predictor of negative attitudes towards these minorities and 
of resistance to immigration, (see, among others, Sigelman and Niemi 2001, Alba, Rumbaut and 
Marotz 2005, Semyonov et al. 2004, Sides and Citrin 2007, Herda 2013), suggesting that this 
phenomenon may have an influence on greater opposition to Muslim immigration and provide a 
potential explanation of what some scholars call ‘platonic islamophobia’, a high negative public 
attitude towards quite non-existent Muslims in the country (Górak-Sosnowska 2011). 
It should be emphasized that resistance to Muslim immigration reflected in the European Social 
Survey (ESS) data is more likely biased downward due to the order in which questions on the 
desired level of different types of immigrants were presented in this survey. According to Sides 
and Citrin (2007, 482), the ESS ‘order effect’ ‘may have engendered a social desirability bias, 
such that respondents were less willing to express negative sentiments toward immigrants of a 
different ethnic background’. Moreover, the most recent wave of European Social Survey used in 
this study was carried out prior to a series of Islamic extremists’ terrorists attacks at different 
European cities (e.g. Brussels, Charleroi, Munich, Nice and Paris) that will probably reinforce in 
public eyes the stereotypical image of Muslims as a potential menace to society, as might be 
suggested by the deterioration of European public opinion on Muslims in general7. Hence, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For instance, between 2014 and 2016, unfavourable views of Muslims minorities living in the country, increased by 
twelve percentage points in Greece, eight points in Spain and Italy, and five points in France, (Wike, Stokes, and 
Simmons 2016).  
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would not be rash to think that Europeans’ opposition to Muslim immigration is more significant 
than the figures above indicate. 
Although the evidence suggests that many Europeans view Muslim immigration negatively, it is 
worth noting that hostility toward Muslim immigration is associated to some extent with 
opposition to immigration in general. It can be seen from Table 2 that among those who want to 
ban Muslim immigration only a tiny fraction is favourable (the responses ‘allow many’ and 
‘allow some’) to the immigration of Gypsies (4%), Jews (26%) and from the poorer countries 
outside Europe (15%). The same Table also indicates that a notable proportion of those pro the 
ban on Muslim immigration were to varying degrees, but without exception, in favour of a 
similar ban on other immigrants, e.g. Gypsies (84%), from poorer countries outside Europe 
(52%) and Jews (42%). In light of these evidences, we can deduce that some of those who are 
against Muslim immigration are anti-immigration in general. I will control for this element in the 
regressions. 
Insert Table 2 here 
Now we turn to the dependent variable. In this analysis, I am interested in individuals’ support 
for a ban on Muslim immigration that may result from two distinct elements: an ‘anti-
immigration effect’ that indicates opposition to immigration in general and a specific ‘anti-
Muslim effect’ that reflects islamophobic attitudes. To isolate the specific anti-Muslim effect, I 
used the seven questions that asked respondents to report their preferred level of different types 
of immigrants to construct a scale, which takes a value of 1 if the individual said ‘No’ to Muslim 
immigrants (response category ‘allow none’) and ‘Yes’ to the other types of immigrants 
(responses, ‘Allow a few’, ‘allow many’, ‘allow some’), and 0 otherwise. This dichotomous 
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variable was used as the dependent variable in different regressions.  
Control variables  
A number of control variables used in this analysis have been identified as relevant in a large 
number of empirical studies on the determinants of individuals’ attitudes towards immigration. 
As was mentioned above, I am primarily interested in the effect of racism and xenophobia on 
opposition to Muslim immigration. Therefore, I begin by discussing the survey items used to 
measure racism and the control variables they generated. 
Tesler (2013), for instance, argues that old-fashioned racism incorporates three elements: beliefs 
in biological inferiority, desire for social distance and support of public policies ensuring racial 
segregation and formalized discrimination. Following Tesler, to assess racist beliefs I used the 
eight ESS items related to biological and cultural racism, social distance towards immigrants, 
opposition to the law against ethnic discrimination, and support for racial immigration policy.  
To construct a biological racism beliefs scale, I used the following three items: ‘Do you think 
some races or ethnic groups are born less intelligent than others?’, ‘Do you think some races or 
ethnic groups are born harder working than others?’, ‘Would you say that some cultures are much 
better than others or that all cultures are equal?’. The answer options to the first two item ‘yes’ 
and ‘no’ were coded equal to 1 for ‘yes’ and equal to 0 for ‘no’. The responses to the last 
question were used to create a third dummy variable set equal to 1 if the respondent think that 
some cultures are much better than other, and 0 otherwise. Then these three dichotomous 
variables were averaged into the index used as control variable.  
Social distance from immigrants was also assessed by an index averaging the scores on two items 
asking respondents how much they would mind if an immigrant was appointed as their boss or 
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married a close family member. These items were scored on an 11-point scale, from 0 ‘not mind’ 
to 10 ‘mind a lot’.  
Opposition to the law against ethnic discrimination was measured by the question: ‘How good or 
bad is it for a country to have a law against racial or ethnic discrimination in the workplace?’. 
The answers were also registered on an 11-point scale, ranging from 0 ‘extremely bad’ to 10 
‘extremely good’. To ease the interpretation, I reversed the scale, so that higher scores stand for 
stronger opposition to the law against this form of discrimination. Support for racist immigration 
policy was assessed by two survey items that ask respondents to rate the importance they attach 
to different criteria for accepting or excluding migrants. I used two of these criteria namely 
‘Christian background’ and ‘be white’ as a measure of individuals’ support for racial immigration 
policy8. The answers to these items rated on a 0-10 scale, from ‘extremely unimportant’ to 
‘extremely important’, were also combined into a composite index. 
The most frequent method to gauge xenophobic feelings is the construction of a composite index 
combining selected survey items. Yet, this method is not exempt from criticism. For instance, 
Fertig and Schmidt (2011) stress that this approach is arbitrary. Nevertheless, different studies 
have found that a summary index using European Social Survey (ESS) items is able to reflect 
appropriately the multidimensionality aspect of xenophobia, see Hjerm (2007), among others. 
Beyond these considerations, following Hjerm (2007) I measured xenophobia by a summary 
index ‘immigration phobia’ made up by the average of responses to seven questions centred on 
opinion about the perceived economic and non-economic threats of immigration on the country 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The other individuals’ characteristics to rate are: have good educational qualifications, able to speak the country’s 
official languages, have work skills that the country needs, and committed to the way of life in the country. 
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including on job opportunities, public finance, crime, cultural life and religious beliefs9. Again, 
respondents to each of these items were asked to rate their responses on an 11-point scale ranging 
from 0 to 10, with 0 representing the most negative view on effect of immigration on the country 
and 10 the most positive. The scores for these items were reversed so that a higher number 
represents stronger xenophobia then averaged into the index.  
Additionally, I exploited the responses to other immigration questions as explanatory variables to 
control for individuals’ opposition to immigrants in general and refugees’ admission as well as 
their resistance to diversity that might also explain individual preference for a ban on Muslims’ 
immigration. To measure opposition to immigration in general I created a dummy variable set 
equal to 1 if the respondent is opposed to immigration of any kind10 (answer ‘allow few’ or 
‘allow none’) and equal to 0 otherwise. Individuals’ opposition to refugees and resistance to 
diversity were measured by responses to: ‘The government should be generous in judging 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 ‘Would you say it is generally bad or good for a country’s economy that people come to live here from other 
countries?’, ‘Would you say that people who come to live here generally take jobs away from workers in this 
country, or generally help to create new jobs?’, ‘Do you think people who come here take out more than they put in 
or put in more than they take out?’, ‘Are a country’s crime problems made worse or better by people coming to live 
here from other countries?’, ‘Cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from 
other countries?’, ‘Is a country made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other 
countries?’, ‘Do you think the religious beliefs and practices in a country are generally undermined or enriched
 
by 
people coming to live here from other countries?’. Note that I deviated slightly from Hjerm (2007) by considering 
the last item as a component of the index. 
10 ‘People of the same race or ethnic group as most the people of [the country]’, ‘People of a different race or ethnic 
group from most people of [the country]’, ‘People from the poorer countries in Europe’, ‘People from poorer 
countries outside Europe’, Gypsies, Jews and Muslims. 
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people’s applications for refugee status’, ‘It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the 
same customs and traditions’. The score for each item on a 5-point scale varying from ‘agree 
strongly’ to ‘disagree strongly’ were recoded to create a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
the answer was ‘disagree’ or ‘disagree strongly’, and the value 0 otherwise.  
The regressions also included a set of variables to control for individuals’ demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics including age in years, two dummy variables ‘Male’ and 
‘Immigrant’ coded 1 respectively for males and for respondents who are themselves immigrants, 
education attainment, measured on a 7-point scale from less than lower secondary to higher 
tertiary education, whether unemployed (for a period of more than 12 months), ideological 
preference, measured through self-placement along the standard 10-point left–right scale, and 
religiosity operationalized by a dichotomous variable equal to one if the respondent belongs to a 
particular religion or denomination, otherwise equal to zero, religious denomination measured in 
three categories: ‘Christian’ ,‘Jew’, and ‘Muslim’, personal contact with different racial or ethnic 
groups captured by two indicators: frequency of contact, measured on a 7-point scale from never 
to every day, and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent has a few or several members of 
minorities as close friends. Finally, in order to control for the fact that the survey was carried out 
at different times and for country-specific unobserved characteristics, all the regressions included 
country and time fixed effects.  
One might expect that individuals who hold racist beliefs, express a high level of immigration 
phobia, oppose immigration of any kind, favour a restrictive admission policy towards refugees, 
oppose cultural diversity, are older, unemployed, have less personal contact with minorities, have 
a relatively low level of education, who placed themselves more to the right on the left–right 
ideological scale and who are not themselves immigrants will be more likely to oppose Muslims’ 
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immigration. On the other hand, due to the absence of theoretical predictions, the effects of the 
variables sex, religiosity in general and religious denomination other than Islam on opposition to 
Muslims’ immigration are a priori undetermined. 
Modelling strategy and results 
Recall that a dependent variable was coded equal to 1 if a respondent reported that he or she is 
pro a ban on Muslim immigration and anti a ban on other types of immigration, 0 otherwise, 
henceforth. To simplify the exposition, henceforth in the rest of the paper I will refer to it by the 
terms ‘against Muslims’ immigration’ or ‘opposition to Muslims’ immigration’, and the reader 
should interpret them as meaning that the respondent is pro a ban on Muslim immigration only. 
Since the dependent variable is dichotomous in order to assess the influence of racism, 
xenophobia and the other variables on the probability of being against Muslims’ immigration, a 
series of binary probit regressions were performed using a forward stepwise procedure, by adding 
distinct categories of explanatory variables sequentially in different equations to derive the final 
model (column 5).  
The starting point was a baseline specification that includes individual demographic and socio-
economic characteristics, religiosity and personal contact with minority groups, column (1). This 
specification was extended to include religious denomination, racism belief and feeling of 
immigration phobia, columns (2) and (3). The following regression added resistance to diversity, 
column (4). Finally, the last regression additionally included opposition to immigration in general 
and to refugees’ admission, column (5). More likely country-specific factors and year of the 
survey might have influenced respondents’ attitudes towards immigration in general and 
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Muslims’ in particular. To control for this year and country effects dummies were included in all 
regressions, although the coefficients are not reported. Table 3 displays the regression results.  
Overall, a majority of variables were statistically significant at the 1% level and in the expected 
direction. More precisely, I found a positive and statistically significant association between the 
probability of being pro a ban on Muslim immigration and the variables age measured in years, 
unemployed, and self-placement on the ideological left-right scale. Although, once accounting 
for other factors, the variables unemployed and ideological self-positioning became statistically 
insignificant, so they were dropped in the final model. In contrast, as expected, education and 
contact with minority groups have a negative effect. These findings are in line with previous 
research that has shown that negative attitudes towards immigration, e.g. Scheve and Slaughter 
(2001), Citrin et al. (1997), Sides and Citrin (2007), and anti-Muslim sentiment, Strabac and 
Listhaug (2008), Savelkoul et al. (2010), Ciftci (2012), Ogan et al. (2014), are much stronger 
among individuals who are older, less-educated, as well as those who place themselves more to 
the right on the ideological scale and who have less personal contact with minority groups.  
Contrary to what was expected and in stark contrast to research findings suggesting that 
immigrants tend to hold more positive attitudes on immigration relative to native-born, for 
example, Sides and Citrin (2007), Scheve and Slaughter (2001), the regression results show that 
immigrants are more likely to be against Muslims’ immigration, columns (3) to (5). Currently no 
explanation for this unexpected and counterintuitive result can be given except to note that anti-
Muslim sentiment has become so mainstream and present in all segments of European societies, 
but so far there is no available evidence supporting or invalidating that immigrants in general 
express stronger anti-Muslim sentiment than native-born. This finding is possibly due to the 
limitation regarding the representativeness of immigrants in the survey sample. The ESS is 
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nationally representative of the general population, but given that a number of foreign-born 
population characteristics are unknown in many European countries, e.g. immigrants’ educational 
attainment in a country such as Belgium, one cannot assume that the sample is adequately 
representative of immigrants. Given this, further research is required before a definite conclusion 
can be drawn in this regard. 
Also the results show that men are less likely to be against Muslim immigration than women (in 
all specifications). Again, at present, I do not have any convincing explanation for this result and 
the fact that previous empirical studies have been inconclusive about the effect of gender on 
attitudes toward immigration does not help in this regard11. Some might speculate, that the high 
opposition of women to Muslims’ immigration might reflect the portrayal of Islam in Europe as a 
misogynistic religion. Although, this interpretation appears to some extent in agreement with Ho 
(2007, 292), who points out that in Western countries ‘Islam’s alleged misogyny is a key tenet of 
arguments against the immigration of Muslims’. However, this assertion does not tell us whether 
women are more inclined than men to associate Islam and Muslims with misogyny.  
Moreover, the findings of the empirical literature on anti-Muslim sentiment do not point to this 
direction. For instance, Ciftci (2012) suggests that, in general, women do no tend to hold more 
negative anti-Muslim sentiment than men. Similarly, other scholars, such as Savelkoul et al. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The literature has reported the ambiguous effect of gender on attitudes towards immigration. Several studies 
suggest that women are less open to immigration than men, e.g. Citrin et al. (1997), Malchow-Møller et al. (2008). 
Others support the opposite conclusion, e.g., or have not found any gender difference, e.g. O’Rourke and Sinnott 
(2006). However, results to date are mixed, for instance Gorodzeisky (2011) reported that, relative to women, men 
are more favourable to the admission of immigrants from richer countries, but there was no gender difference 
towards immigrants from poorer countries. 
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(2011), using survey data just for the Netherlands and Strabac and Listhaug (2008), Ogan et al. 
(2014), using data for different countries, found that females are less likely to be more prejudiced 
against Muslims than their male counterparts. However, these works do not give any clue about 
why men and women differ in anti-Muslim sentiment. This means that the explanation of the fact 
that women are more likely to be pro a ban against Muslims’ immigration remains an open 
empirical question that needs further investigation.  
Another interesting result, as shown in column (1), compared to non-religious persons, religious 
individuals do not have a higher or lower probability of being against Muslim immigration. This 
is also true for Jews and Christians as well, column (2). These findings are in concordance with 
other studies on attitudes towards Muslims12. For example, Strabac and Listhaug (2008) have 
shown that religiosity has no effect on anti-Muslim prejudice in 30 European countries. 
Similarly, analyzing public opinion in France, Great Britain, Germany, Spain and the United 
States, Ogan et al. (2014) found that in almost all these countries religiosity is not a predictor of 
anti-Muslim attitudes. The exception is France where respondents who considered religion more 
important were more likely to hold a more positive opinion of Muslims.   
Finally, a priori, I expected that opposition to Muslim immigration is driven by racist 
considerations and xenophobia. Consistent with my prediction, the regression results show a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 However, we should note that the literature is not clear-cut on the relationship between religiosity and attitudes 
towards immigration. Some empirical findings indicate that this relation is positive. Others reached a mixed 
conclusion, for example, Ben-Num Bloom, Arikan and Courtemanche (2015) argue that religiosity may either reduce 
or exacerbate immigration sentiments, depending on the dimension of religiosity considered as well as the 
similarities and/or differences between immigrants and natives. For an excellent review of this literature, see Ben-
Num Bloom, Arikan and Courtemanche (2015). 
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positive and statistically significant association (at the 1% level) between the different indicators 
of racism and the probability of being against Muslim immigration, columns (2) to (5). More 
precisely, support of a ban on Muslim immigration is more likely to come from persons who hold 
biological racism beliefs, feel a great social distance from immigrants, who oppose the law 
against ethnic discrimination and support racial immigration policy. These results are in 
agreement with the conclusions of two cases studies. Ayers et al. (2009) note that Anglo 
immigration policy preferences towards Latinos in San Diego County is motivated more by racial 
resentments than other considerations. In the same vein, Dustmann and Preston (2007) assert that 
racial prejudice is an important determinant of British people’s attitudes to further immigration, 
especially of immigrants that are ethnically more distant from the majority population.  
Similarly, as hypothesized, a high level of immigration phobia, resistance to diversity, opposition 
to immigration in general and to refugees’ admission in particular constitute other factors that 
affect positively the probability to be pro a ban on Muslims’ immigration, as shown in columns 
(3), (4) and (5).  
Insert Table 3 here 
Conclusion 
Recent years have seen a dramatic increase in anti-Muslim sentiment in Europe. One of its 
manifestations is the adoption by different countries of legislations limiting the visibility of 
Islamic signs and symbols, e.g. bans on Islamic women’s veils, like the hijab and burqa in the 
public sphere and the construction of minarets and mosques. These examples represent just the 
tip of the iceberg when it comes to the hostility towards Muslims. Hate crimes against Muslims, 
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and attacks on mosques and Islamic cultural centres are other signs of the growing islamophobia 
that European Muslims are living with. Nowadays Muslims are associated with several negative 
words. To name just a few: fanatic, violent, extremist and terrorist. In this context, the growing 
European Muslim minority population, due mainly to immigration and the difference in fertility 
rate between Muslims and non-Muslims, is considered as a threat to national ‘identity’ and 
security by extreme right-wing political parties and other populist groups. Because Muslims’ 
fertility is beyond their control, they consider that a ban on Muslims’ immigration is the only way 
to stop the ‘islamization of their countries’. Unfortunately, the available evidence reveals that this 
discourse has found great resonance within European public opinions.  
Surprisingly, despite scholarly interest in anti-Muslim sentiment, European support of a ban on 
Muslims’ immigration has not received much attention. This paper was intended to fill this gap in 
the literature. The analysis of individuals’ preferred level of Muslim immigration in 20 European 
countries led to three main findings. First, an overwhelming majority of Europeans reported a 
preference for restrictive immigration policies towards Muslims. For instance, 65% or more of 
Czechs (83%), Hungarians (82%), Estonians (70%) and Poles (65%) would like their countries to 
‘allow a few’ or ‘allow none’ Muslim immigrants. Moreover, the majority of Czechs (54%) and 
Hungarians (51%) were in favour of a complete ban on Muslim immigration in their countries 
(‘allow none’) and a significant proportion of Estonians (42%), Lithuanians (34%), Portuguese 
(33%) and Poles (33%) share the same opinion. Secondly, the paper’s findings reveal that better 
educated people and those who have personal contact with minorities are less likely to be pro a 
ban on Muslims’ immigration while religious individuals do not have a higher or lower 
probability of being against Muslims’ immigration relative to non-religious persons. This is also 
true for Jews and Christians. Thirdly, this study shows that racist beliefs, the perception of 
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immigration as a threat, resistance to diversity, opposition to immigration in general and support 
for restrictive admission policies vis-a-vis refugees play an important role in shaping individuals’ 
opposition to more Muslims’ immigration. This suggests that a ban on Muslims’ immigration is 
more driven by these factors than other considerations, e.g. religiosity. Therefore, public policies 
that reduce individuals’ fear of immigration and promote tolerance, anti-racism, multiculturalism 
and positive attitudes to refugees could help to reduce Europeans’ resistance to Muslims’ 
immigration.  
Limitations of this study include the use of a cross-sectional approach, due to the fact that only 
the most recent wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) used in this study contains a question 
on the preferred level of Muslims’ immigration, which does not allow drawing a conclusion on 
the causal effects of the control variables. Therefore, the observed relationships should be 
interpreted as correlations. Additionally, because the ESS does not include questions that capture 
individuals’ perception of the size of Muslim minority populations living in the country nor their 
view of Muslims in general and Muslim minorities in particular, I was not able to empirically test 
whether these factors also predict Europeans’ support for a ban on Muslims’ immigration. This 
might be explored in future research. Nonetheless, despite these shortcomings, I believe that the 
results of this article add a piece of evidence to the literature on anti-Muslim sentiment, the 
analysis of the factors driving Europeans to support a ban on Muslims’ immigration. 
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Table 1 – Europeans’ resistance to Muslims’ immigration, and Muslim minorities’ demographic 
size 
 
Attitudes towards Muslims’ 
immigration 
European Muslims Populations, in 
2010 
 Restriction on Muslims’ immigration (in %) 
Ban on Muslims’ 
immigration (in %) 
In absolute 
values 
In % of total 
population 
Austria 52 20 450,000 5.4 
Belgium 47 19 630,000 5.9 
Czech Republic 83 54 <10,000 <0.1 
Denmark 45 11 230,000 4.1 
Estonia 70 42 <10,000 <0.7 
Finland 61 17 40,000 <0.2 
France 34 13 4,710,000 7.5 
Germany 28 7 4,760,000 5.8 
Hungary 82 51 <10,000 <0.2 
Ireland 54 22 50,000 1.1 
Lithuania 62 34 <10,000 <0.3 
Netherlands 46 13 1,000,000 6 
Norway 34 9 180,000 3.7 
Poland 65 33 <10,000 <0.1 
Portugal 62 33 30,000 0.3 
Slovenia 43 20 70,000 3.6 
Spain 52 20 980,000 2.1 
Sweden 18 4 430,000 4.6 
Switzerland 42 12 380,000 4.9 
United Kingdom 44 17 2,960,000 4.8 
Note: Restrict Muslims’ immigration corresponds to the sum of ‘allow few’ and ‘allow none’; ban on Muslims’ 
immigration refers to the response category ‘allow none’. The proportions correspond to the number of cases out of 
total responses including no response. Whenever I report percentages or other summary statistics I weight responses 
using the survey weight (dweight) to ensure that each country’s sample represents the appropriate total population.  
Source: European Social Survey (ESS) for attitudes towards Muslims’ immigration and PEW Research Center 
(2015) for Muslims’ minority population, and author calculations. 
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Table 2 – European preferred levels of immigration of the different immigrant categories 
conditional on ban on Muslim immigration, in percentages 
Other immigrant categories Ban on Muslim immigration (allow none) 
 
Allow 
many 
Allow 
some 
Allow a 
few 
Allow 
none Total 
Gypsies  0.4 3.6 12.0 84.0 100 
Jews  5.2 20.7 31.9 42.2 100 
From poorer countries in Europe 2.6 18.8 38.3 40.3 100 
From poorer countries outside Europe 1.6 12.9 33.9 51.6 100 
From the same race/ethnicity as the majority 
of the country’s residents 8.9 31.9 36.7 22.5 100 
From different race/ethnicity to the majority 
of the country’s residents 2.0 18.5 40.3 39.2 100 
Source: European Social Survey (ESS) and author calculations. 
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Table 3 – Individual opposition to Muslims’ immigration 
Against Muslims’ immigration and in favour of increasing other types of immigration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Demographic characteristics      
Immigrant -0.018 0.0476 0.203*** 0.211*** 0.210*** 
 (0.036) (0.043) (0.048) (0.048) (0.046) 
Male  -0.038** -0.106*** -0.107*** -0.113*** -0.119*** 
 (0.019) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) 
Age 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Socio-economic characteristics      
Educational attainment -0.108*** -0.082*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.052*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Unemployed 0.080*** 0.079** 0.038 
 
 
 (0.028) (0.033) (0.036) 
 
 
Self-placement on the ideological left-right scale 0.040*** 0.013** 0.011* 0.009  
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)  
Belongs to religion or denomination -0.016 
   
 
 (0.021) 
   
 
Muslim 
 
-0.967*** -0.798*** -0.757*** -0.817*** 
 
 
(0.195) (0.202) (0.201) (0.193) 
Jew 
 
0.227 0.038 
 
 
 
 
(0.288) (0.317) 
 
 
Christian 
 
-0.076*** -0.043 
 
 
 
 
(0.025) (0.027) 
 
 
Contact with different ethnic group    
Frequency of personal contact with minorities -0.039*** -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.042*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Minorities’ members as close friends -0.270*** -0.138*** -0.101*** -0.093*** -0.082*** 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) 
(Continued) 
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Table 3 – Continued  
Against Muslims’ immigration and in favour of increasing other types of immigration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Racism and xenophobia      
Biological racism beliefs  0.512*** 0.354*** 0.341*** 0.327*** 
  (0.034) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) 
Social distance from immigrants   0.088*** 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.048*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Support of racial immigration policy  0.085*** 0.075*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Opposition to law against ethnic discrimination  0.166*** 0.081** 0.085*** 0.083*** 
  (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) 
Immigration phobia   0.253*** 0.243*** 0.206*** 
   (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Resistance to diversity and opposition to immigration       
Resistance to diversity 
  
 0.189*** 0.186*** 
 
  
 (0.026) (0.025) 
Favours restrictive immigration policy towards all 
immigrants 
  
  0.166*** 
 
  
  (0.033) 
Favours restrictive admission policy towards refugees 
  
  0.269*** 
 
  
  (0.026) 
Constant -0.956*** -1.575*** -3.005*** -3.054*** -2.954*** 
 (0.0805) (0.0991) (0.121) (0.121) (0.122) 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Countries fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.30 
Number of observations 32,790 26,998 24,626 24,618 26,080 
Note: Entries are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 
5% level, *** Significant at 1% level.  
 
